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3 
Abstract 
BACKGROUND 
Despite a long interest in the historical fertility transition, there is still a lack of 
knowledge about disaggregated patterns that could help us understand the mechanisms 
behind the transition. In previous research the widely held view is that there was a 
change in the association between social status and fertility in conjunction with the 
fertility transition, implying that fertility went from being positively connected to social 
status (higher status was connected with higher fertility) to being negatively associated 
with fertility.  
 
OBJECTIVE 
The aim of this collection is to study socioeconomic patterns in the fertility transition in 
a variety of contexts using similar approaches and measures of socioeconomic status. 
 
METHOD 
All contributions use different kinds of micro-level socioeconomic and demographic 
data and statistical models in the analysis. Data either come from census-like records or 
population registers. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
There is no consistent evidence for the hypothesis that socioeconomic  status was 
positively related to fertility before the demographic transition. While such a correlation 
was clearly present in some contexts it was clearly not in others. There is more support 
for the idea that the upper and middle classes acted as forerunners in the transition, 
while farmers especially were late to change their fertility behavior. It is also evident 
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that both parity-specific stopping and prolonged birth intervals  (spacing) were 
important in the fertility transition. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This special collection is devoted to the interplay between socioeconomic status and 
fertility, and this type of study requires a long historical and comparative perspective, 
analyzing this complex issue using different types of micro-level data. In the literature 
there  is  a widely held view that the association between social status and fertility 
changed in conjunction with the fertility transition. This view holds that fertility 
changed from being positively connected to social status (higher status was connected 
with higher fertility) to being negatively associated with social status (higher status 
became connected to low fertility) (see Clark and Cummins 2009; Clark and Hamilton 
2006; Skirbekk 2008). In a global context, Myrskylä, Kohler, and Billari (2009) found 
this type of reversal of fertility differentials at higher levels of economic and social 
development, measured by the Human Development Index (HDI), but their results were 
recently questioned based on revised estimates of the HDI (Harttgen and Vollmer 
2014). 
What the literature has lacked is systematic empirical investigations using 
comparable measures of socioeconomic status, where these differentials can be studied 
at the micro level with data covering the entire fertility transition. It was to collect 
empirical studies of this type that a workshop was organized in Alghero, Sardinia (Italy) 
in September 2012 on the theme “Socioeconomic status and fertility before, during and 
after the demographic transition”. The workshop was organized by the IUSSP panel for 
Historical Demography, chaired by Michel Oris and by the Italian Society of Historical 
Demography. Lucia Pozzi, member of the former and president of the latter, and her 
team were great hosts in the magnificent setting of the old Catalan town. Martin Dribe 
completed the team and acted as the scientific leader. This special collection presents a 
selection of revised contributions from the Alghero workshop. All papers deal in 
different ways with the complex association between socioeconomic status and fertility, 
and most contributions make use of an identical occupational class scheme, 
HISCLASS, to facilitate comparison of the results (see Van Leeuwen and Maas 2011). 
In turn, this class scheme requires pre-coding of all occupational titles in the Historical 
International Standard Classification of Occupations (HISCO; see Van Leeuwen, Maas 
and Miles 2002). 
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2. Survey of the field and theoretical foundations 
Across the western world there were dramatic changes in family life around the turn of 
the twentieth century. Following a sustained increase in human longevity, family size 
more than halved during the great fertility decline (e.g., Coale and Watkins 1986). 
These changes during the demographic transition had a profound impact not only on the 
lives of ordinary people but, according to one theory, also on the transition to modern 
(sustained) economic growth (Galor 2011). Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
demographic revolution of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was as 
important  to humanity as the Neolithic and industrial revolutions. Despite this 
importance, as was noted in a recent survey by Guinnane (2011), we still lack a clear 
understanding of this process and of which were the important mechanisms producing 
this change. There are a number of theories focusing on the greater importance of 
education, women’s relative wages and independence, mortality decline, new attitudes 
and norms, secularization, and so on, but the empirical picture is much less detailed 
(e.g., Alter 1992; Guinnane 2011; Hirschman 1994; Schultz 2002). 
Indeed, in previous research the main evidence has been collected at aggregate 
levels (countries or regions), but the results have been inconclusive.
4 While some have 
stressed the importance of industrialization and urbanization (see, e.g., Brown and 
Guinnane 2002; Carlsson 1966; Davis 1945; Dribe 2009; Galloway, Hammel and Lee 
1994; Notestein 1945), or the previous decline in infant and child mortality (Davis 
1945; Dyson 2010; Easterlin 1996: 107-108; Notestein 1945; Reher 1999; Reher and 
Sanz-Gimeno 2007), others have emphasized  ideational change affecting people’s 
attitudes and readiness to limit family size (Cleland and Wilson 1987; Knodel and van 
de Walle 1979; Lesthaeghe 1977, 1980; Lesthaeghe and Wilson 1986). In addition, 
combinations of these different approaches are also common in the literature. One 
example is Simon Szreter, who in his study of the 1911 British census stressed changes 
in perceived costs of children as a crucial mover behind the fertility transition. This 
evolution is the product both of changes in real incentives and of new attitudes and 
norms diffusing geographically and socially (Szreter 1996).  
To advance knowledge in this area we need a much better picture of the fertility 
decline at the micro level. More specifically, in this special collection, rather than cover 
the whole story of the fertility transition we instead cover one crucial aspect: how socio-
economic status affected fertility during the transition and how individual and/or family 
position in the social stratification filtered other influences on birth control and family 
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size. The aim is to substantiate empirically some of the theoretical predictions put 
forward in the literature.  
Swedish sociologist Gösta Carlsson (1966) made the distinction between 
innovation and adjustment as the main processes or explanations of fertility decline. 
Although this framework has later been extended and refined in various ways, e.g., in 
the supply-demand framework developed by Easterlin (1975, 1996), the basic 
distinction between innovation-based and adjustment-based explanations has survived 
(see, e.g., Van Bavel 2010). Some authors criticize viewing innovation and adjustment 
as alternative or competing theories of fertility change and argue for blended models 
where innovation diffusion takes place in conjunction with structural change affecting 
the demand for and supply of children (see Cleland 2001; Palloni 2001). In other words, 
innovation  diffusion cannot take place unless there are preferences for lower fertility to 
begin with. A similar view of fertility change characterizes the Ready-Willing-Able 
model developed by Coale (1973; see also Lesthaeghe and Vanderhoeft 2001). 
The main difference in views then becomes whether such preferences were already 
common in pre-transitional populations, making them open to  innovation, or if the 
lower demand for children came as a result of factors associated with industrialization 
(Coale 1973; Easterlin 1975, 1996; Easterlin and Crimmins 1985; see also Lesthaeghe 
and Vanderhoeft 2001). In the second case, adjustment factors such as new conditions 
for childbearing and family life encourage families to change their behavior. From an 
economic perspective the demand for children can be defined as the number of children 
a couple wants if there are no costs to limit fertility (Easterlin and Crimmins 1985). 
This demand depends on family income and the cost of children in relation to other 
goods. Children are assumed to be normal goods, implying that a higher income 
increases fertility, while a higher relative price of children lowers it. The demand for 
children is also dependent on preferences for consuming other goods: a higher demand 
for consumption of other goods lowers the demand for children. From a historical 
perspective the demand for child quality is often believed to have been driven by 
economic changes following industrialization and urbanization which made education 
and other investments in children ever more important (Becker 1981; Galor 2011; Praz 
2005; Wahl 1992). Thus, demand for child quality has increased at the expense of child 
quantity. This helps to explain why fertility does not increase together with rising 
incomes in the process of modern economic growth. Instead, the decline in fertility has 
been seen as a crucial part, and sometimes even a root cause, of modern economic 
growth (Galor 2011; see also Becker, Cinnirella and Woessmann 2010; Guinnane 
2011).  
The argument is that technological progress during industrialization gradually 
increased demand for human capital, which in turn led parents to invest more in their 
children’s human capital because they foresaw a greater demand in the future. This Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 7 
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implied a faster rate of economic growth, increased per-capita income,  and a 
reallocation of resources toward the quality of children (Galor 2011). However, the 
actual importance of human capital and education to workers in the early stages of the 
British industrialization process has been questioned by several scholars, and similar 
claims could be made for other contexts (Galor 2011: 30–37; Mitch 1999; Schön 2000). 
For the later stages of the industrialization process, however, there is little question of 
the importance  of education to  economic growth (see, e.g., Abramovitz and David 
1973; Goldin and Katz 1998). On the other hand, Mokyr (2002, 2009) has argued 
strongly for the large role played by (useful) knowledge in a more general sense in 
bringing about the innovations of the industrial revolution, which is connected more to 
the relatively few inventors and innovators than to the workforce at large. Regardless of 
its actual importance to economic growth, however, we would expect the number of 
children in a family to be negatively related to the level of investment  in  their 
education, as longer schooling was associated with direct costs related to going to 
school (material, clothes etc.), as well as to the possible indirect costs of lower family 
revenue from the children’s labor contribution.  
The supply of children can be defined as the number of surviving children a couple 
has if they make no conscious effort to limit the size of their family (Easterlin and 
Crimmins 1985). Thus supply reflects natural fertility as well as child survival. High 
child mortality is clearly another important element, because it constitutes a limit on 
this potential supply. Cultural factors outside the immediate control of the family that 
influence the level of natural fertility, such as breastfeeding practices, might also 
impose such a limit. Declining mortality in the first phase of the demographic transition 
changed the supply of children: this was one important factor in the fertility decline 
(e.g., Galloway, Lee and Hammel 1998; Oris 1995; Reher 1999; Reher and Sanz-
Gimeno 2007; see also Dyson 2010). However, the magnitude of the mortality decline 
was much smaller than the decline in fertility, implying that mortality could only have 
been one of several important determinants of fertility decline (cf. Haines 1998). 
Moreover, there was often a long time lag between the beginnings of the mortality and 
fertility declines, sometimes as much as 100 years, making it even more unlikely that 
mortality decline was a sufficient cause of fertility decline (Bengtsson and Ohlsson 
1994; Perrenoud and Bourdelais 1998).  
Taken together, the economic, demographic,  and social changes following 
agricultural modernization, and later also industrialization and urbanization processes, 
created new conditions for both working and family life. These changes included, for 
instance, the expansion of wage labor outside the home, the increased importance of 
education, higher proportions of people living and working in urban areas, less use of 
children in household production, and better child survival, which led families to adjust 
their target family size (Schumacher 2010). Dribe, Oris & Pozzi: Socioeconomic status and fertility before, during and after the demographic transition 
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At the same time, a popular view in historical demography since the days of the 
European Fertility Project has been that fertility in pre-transitional society was not 
deliberately controlled, but ‘natural’ (Henry 1961). Natural fertility in this sense is, 
however, not the same as the absence of deliberate fertility control, as has been shown 
by the existence of deliberate spacing in times of economic stress long before the 
fertility transition (Bengtsson and Dribe 2006; Dribe and Scalone 2010). In fact, fertility 
was not considered to have been within “the calculus of conscious choice” (Coale 
1973), and the main explanation behind the fertility transition was families innovating 
to adjust fertility within marriage to economic circumstances (Coale and Watkins 
1986). Consequently, women stopped childbearing after having reached a certain target 
family size:  in other words, the control was parity-specific. Subsequent studies, 
however, have also stressed the importance of longer birth intervals (spacing) in the 
transition (see, e.g., Bean, Mineau and Anderton 1990; Crafts 1989; David and 
Sanderson 1986; Oris 1995; Szreter 1996). According to this view, fertility decline was 
not so much a response to changing economic and demographic conditions as to the 
diffusion of new ideas and attitudes about birth control, to a large extent related to 
broader value changes; for example, secularization, which came about in the period of 
modernization (e.g., Casterline 2001; Cleland 2001; Cleland and Wilson 1987; 
Lesthaeghe 1977; Lesthaeghe and Vanderhoeft 2001; Oris 1995). In the model of 
Easterlin and Crimmins (1985) this  type  of change affected the costs of fertility 
regulation, which can be defined as the direct monetary costs and the psychic costs of 
regulating fertility. New, more positive attitudes toward fertility control among broader 
segments of the population lowered these costs. 
In this way, fertility decline can be considered the result of both adjustment of 
behavior to new socio-economic circumstances,  and innovation in the form of new 
attitudes and values, lowering the costs of fertility control. We expect different socio-
economic groups to have been differently affected by both innovation and adjustment. 
We expect the middle classes to have been affected first by changes in adjustment 
because they engaged in more skilled occupations where returns to education should 
have increased first; thus, the quantity-quality trade-off should have set in earlier. On 
the other hand, we believe that cultural change affecting attitudes, secularization, etc., 
originated in the upper classes, gradually diffused to the middle classes, and then to the 
working class (Frykman and Löfgren 1987; Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988; Livi-Bacci 
1986; Shorter 1975; Van de Putte 2007). This position is in line with Rogers’ classic 
theory of innovation  diffusion, in which innovations are thought to diffuse through 
social systems and where the likelihood of adopting new ideas is positively associated 
with socioeconomic status. Early adopters are usually found in the higher-status groups, 
while low socioeconomic status is associated with being a late adopter of innovation 
(Rogers 2003 [1962]). Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 7 
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3. Summary of papers 
Martin Dribe and Francesco Scalone have looked at the long-term development of 
socioeconomic fertility differentials in Sweden using micro-level data from five 
complete count censuses in Sweden from 1880-1970. Each census contains information 
for 5-8 million individuals, allowing for a very detailed picture of socioeconomic status 
and fertility. Fertility is measured indirectly by child-woman ratios; these indicate net-
fertility (surviving children aged 0-4). A careful sensitivity analysis shows that these 
measures are robust to socioeconomic differentials in infant and child mortality. Their 
results are not fully consistent with the widely held view that the direction of social-
status differences in fertility changed during the transition from higher status being 
connected to high fertility to higher status being connected to low fertility. They find no 
indication that elite groups had higher net-fertility than other social groups immediately 
before the fertility transition. Instead, most evidence seems to suggest that fertility 
differentials were smaller before than they were during or after the transition.  
In the early phase of the transition the upper and middle classes had much lower 
net-fertility than lower-skilled workers, but there was no clear gradient from highest to 
lowest socioeconomic status. In the 1960s, well after the end of the fertility transition, 
the middle class had the lowest levels of fertility, while the elite, farmers, and rural 
laborers had the highest. The low fertility of the upper classes in the early phases of the 
transition is consistent with explanations focusing both on adjustment of fertility to new 
socioeconomic circumstances and on diffusion of new attitudes toward birth control and 
ideal number of children. The fact that in 1880 the elite (the highest group comprising 
approximately 3% of the population) had lower fertility than other groups and that in 
1890-1900 it was the upper-middle class (lower managers and professionals) that had 
the  lowest  fertility may be taken as an indication of the importance of innovation-
diffusion factors, as economic adjustment would not have been a major factor in elite 
group fertility, as they experienced both low opportunity costs of child bearing (low 
female labor force participation) and a high material standard of living, allowing both 
spacious housing and domestic servants. It may well have been the case that new 
attitudes to birth control developed and spread through society, first affecting the 
behavior of the most affluent groups and then after some delay the middle classes. After 
the transition the low fertility of the middle class is clearly consistent with a trade-off 
between quantity and quality of children.  
Looking at a geographically confined area in southern Sweden, Tommy Bengtsson 
and Martin Dribe analyze fertility differentials by social class using longitudinal micro-
level data from the Scanian Economic-Demographic Database (SEDD) encompassing 
the entire fertility transition as well as approximately 60 years of pre-transitional 
fertility. They show that the fertility transition involved not only parity-specific Dribe, Oris & Pozzi: Socioeconomic status and fertility before, during and after the demographic transition 
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stopping but also prolonged birth intervals, implying that more-recently married 
couples also controlled fertility. The interval between marriage and first birth was 
initially shorter for lower socioeconomic strata, implying that marriage and first-birth 
decisions were tightly interlinked in this group. While elite and middle class families 
had higher fertility prior to the fertility transition, it was already declining in the 1880s, 
earlier than in lower status groups, and also declined more consistently. Skilled laborers 
and farmers followed in succeeding decades, and low-skilled and unskilled laborers 
followed a few decades later still. Thus, while fertility initially diverged in absolute 
terms by socioeconomic status, it converged somewhat at the end of the transition. In 
relative terms, however, a similar convergence did not take place, especially not for 
higher-order births. The elite group and middle class were the first to start to limit their 
fertility, followed by skilled workers and farmers, and finally unskilled workers. 
These socioeconomic patterns of the fertility transition do not appear immediately 
consistent with several of the major explanations put forward in the literature, such as 
the decline of infant and child mortality, increased female labor force participation, and 
a quantity-quality tradeoff. Although the latter two may have started to play more of a 
role in the later stages of the transition it was not until the post-transitional period that 
they became really important, when the educational system and married women’s labor 
force participation really expanded. Mortality decline, on the other hand, might have 
been of some importance to the overall fertility decline, but cannot explain much of the 
SES-specific pattern. The socioeconomic pattern observed is, however, consistent with 
an innovation process where new ideas and attitudes about family limitation spread 
from the elite to other social groups. Whether this really was the explanation for the 
pattern observed is, of course, impossible to ascertain, but there is clearly no reason to 
rule it out. The high benefits and comparatively low costs of children could also help to 
explain the lag in the decline among farmers and laborers. 
Italy had large regional variations in the start and course of the fertility transition. 
As is the case for many countries, we know a great deal about these patterns at the 
aggregate level (e.g., Livi Bacci 1977) but much less about details such as differentials 
by socioeconomic status, which normally require micro-level data. Marco Breschi, 
Alessio Fornasin, and Matteo Manfredini provide a careful analysis of the 1961 fertility 
census in Italy, which gives detailed information about completed fertility for cohorts 
born before 1912. They look at the development in four different areas with highly 
diverging trends, focusing special attention on the association between education, 
occupation, and fertility. They note large disparities in the Italian fertility transition, 
with some areas being well into their transition by the time of the cohorts born in the 
late nineteenth century, while other areas show very little change even for cohorts born 
in approximately 1910, who were of prime childbearing age in 1930-1950. Both Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 7 
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spacing and stopping were at work, with a significant decline in age at last birth of 
about five years, and increasing inter-birth intervals. 
Women’s education was a very important determinant of fertility, especially in 
older cohorts. Already among cohorts born before 1890, women with post-primary 
education had around two children on average, while illiterate women had around five, 
and women with only primary education had four children. Clearly, there had been an 
early fertility decline among the educated, while other women lagged behind. To some 
extent, however, these differences are explained by urban-rural differences, but, overall, 
women’s education appears a  much  less important  determinant of fertility than 
socioeconomic status measured by occupational sector. As the labor force participation 
rate of women born before 1912 was very low in Italy, and socioeconomic status of the 
husband was controlled for in the analysis, Breschi et al. explain the educational 
differentials mainly in ideational terms. Educated women might have been more open 
to new ideas and behaviors concerning family limitation, and might have had a stronger 
bargaining position in the household. Moreover, they may have been more independent 
in forming attitudes, for example in relation to religion and the Catholic Church, 
thereby being early adopters of more secular ideas, which have proven important for 
fertility decline (e.g., Lesthaeghe and Wilson 1986). 
One of the populations studied by Breschi et al. is the town of Alghero on the 
island of Sardinia. It was distinctive in showing no signs of fertility transition for the 
cohorts born before 1912. In the paper by Marco Breschi, Massimo Esposito, Stanislao 
Mazzoni, and Lucia Pozzi, a more detailed analysis of fertility in Alghero is presented. 
The analysis shows a more or less completely pre-transitional situation until the 1930s, 
with natural fertility in the sense of Henry (1961). It is only among certain sub-groups 
in the population that a change to lower fertility can be detected. The analysis gives a 
very good picture of fertility differentials in a pre-transitional population, focusing 
particularly on socioeconomic differentials. 
The results show only small fertility differentials in the pre-transition phase, i.e., 
before any decline had taken place. While the upper class of non-manual workers had 
somewhat higher fertility, the difference was very small and not statistically significant. 
In other words, there is little to no evidence supporting the hypothesis of high fertility 
among elite populations before the fertility decline. There was, however, a pronounced 
socioeconomic pattern in the start of the decline. Non-manual workers were forerunners 
in the transition process, and the cohorts born in 1886-1905 had more than 20% lower 
fertility than unskilled workers or farmers. The skilled workers followed the upper 
classes, showing a decline for these cohorts, but still had higher fertility than the upper 
class. It remains unclear whether these patterns were due to some type of adjustment to 
new socioeconomic conditions affecting the upper class first, or whether it had more to Dribe, Oris & Pozzi: Socioeconomic status and fertility before, during and after the demographic transition 
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do with adopting new attitudes and behaviors imported from other parts of Italy or from 
elsewhere in Europe. 
Thomas Maloney,  Heidi Hanson,  and  Ken Smith  investigate socioeconomic 
fertility differentials in the frontier state of Utah in the United States. In previous 
research the fertility transition of the United States has often been viewed as an 
anomaly, connected to the special character of a country with a moving agricultural 
frontier and an early fertility decline. Maloney et al. connect to this research using 
unique micro-level data from the Utah Population Data Base (UPDB), with detailed 
fertility histories for approximately 50,000 women taken from birth cohorts from the 
1850s to the 1910s. While the fertility transition has been studied previously using the 
same data (Bean, Mineau and Anderton 1990), this is the first study to focus explicitly 
on the association between social class and fertility.   
In Utah all socioeconomic groups took part in the transition, and even though 
white collar workers lead the decline in several respects the main pattern is still one of 
considerable simultaneity between groups. When fertility started to decline it was the 
result of later starting, longer birth intervals,  and earlier stopping. In particular, in 
regard to the delayed starting of fertility measured by age at marriage and length of time 
between marriage and first birth, white collar families seem to have changed behavior 
more quickly and earlier than other groups. This change may have been related to 
longer education and training. Longer inter-birth intervals were also important in the 
fertility transition of Utah, but there were few noticeable differences across 
socioeconomic groups in this change. In terms of stopping, it was farm families 
especially that lagged in the transition, which it seems natural to connect to a higher 
demand for children on the farms, both as labor and as a source of old-age support. 
Taken as a whole, the socioeconomic patterns in fertility in Utah seem to be well 
in line with standard economic explanations of fertility change, focusing on the demand 
for children and its relationship to education, labor market, and old age security. This is 
also the case in much previous scholarship on American fertility, which has focused 
great attention on the interplay between changing conditions in the farm sector and 
fertility in relation to migration, land availability, and old age security (e.g., Easterlin 
1976; Sundstrom and David 1988). Maloney et al. make a valuable addition to this 
scholarship by charting how socioeconomic status and fertility interacted in the frontier 
regions of the United States. 
The rural parts of Quebec in Canada showed quite different patterns from those in 
Utah, as clearly shown in the paper by Hélène Vézina, Danielle Gauvreau, and Alain 
Gagnon, analyzing fertility patterns in the Saguenay-Lac-St. Jean region. They make 
use of the unique BALSAC database, which contains a wealth of information from 
church and civil records covering the period approximately 1830-1970.  This paper 
includes data for approximately 87,000 first marriages. The fertility transition came late Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 7 
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to Quebec compared to regions in Western Europe or the United States. In the region 
studied it did not start until after 1940 and was still ongoing even as late as the early 
1970s. Vézina et al. relate this late transition to the region being both rural and remotely 
located, with limited influence from cities such as Montreal and Quebec City. Part of 
the explanation also rests with the fact that the population was largely French Catholic 
and had a comparatively low level of education. In contrast to the situation in Utah, 
delayed starting played no role in explaining the fertility transition, which instead was 
largely a result of parity-specific stopping. 
In terms of socioeconomic differentials, the upper/middle class of non-manual 
workers had lower fertility than the other groups, all of which had similar levels. This 
pattern is well in  line with other parts of Quebec (Gauvreau et al. 2007) and was 
connected mainly to cultural rather than socioeconomic factors. During the transition, 
when socioeconomic variables became increasingly important as fertility determinants, 
the upper classes started to limit family size first, followed by other classes in a more or 
less hierarchical way, with the exception of farmers who experienced the most delayed 
transition of all socioeconomic groups. This development led to a widening of 
socioeconomic differentials during the transition and a convergence toward the end.  
In her analysis of the Netherlands, Hilde Bras  deepens the analysis of how 
diffusion of new fertility behavior actually took place in the Dutch fertility transition. 
She focuses special attention on the role of networks in this diffusion process, to shed 
more light on whether observed fertility differentials by social class might actually be 
explained by differential access to social networks. She thereby connects her study to 
more recent developments in fertility theory which have argued for ‘blended models’, 
where structural adjustment and innovation diffusion are seen as complementary forces 
determining fertility decline through social learning processes (e.g., Casterline 2001; 
Cleland 2001; Palloni 2001; see also Van Bavel 2004; Vanhaute and Matthijs 2007 for 
empirical evidence). As Bras puts it: “…the engine of demographic change is the 
structural transformation and diffusion is the lubricant.” To  assess empirically the 
importance of innovation diffusion, she uses data from the Historical Sample of the 
Netherlands (HSN) covering approximately 3,000 couples whose reproductive careers 
span the period 1870-1940. The social network is measured by marriage witnesses, 
showing with whom the marital couple had contact or wanted to have contact. It also 
allows distinguishing the importance of lateral kin and age peers vs. vertical, or 
intergenerational, ties. This could tell us something about diffusion of new fertility 
behavior, which is assumed to occur more easily in age-homophilous networks of 
lateral connections (see McCray Beier 2003). Similarly, the geographical and 
occupational distributions of the witnesses are analyzed to gain insight into possible 
mechanisms in the diffusion process. Dribe, Oris & Pozzi: Socioeconomic status and fertility before, during and after the demographic transition 
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The results of the empirical analysis show that there were only small 
socioeconomic fertility differentials in the Netherlands in the early phases of the 
transition (1890-1920). The upper and middle classes started to adjust fertility first, 
followed by other classes; by the last phase of the transition, only the laborers (urban as 
well as rural) lagged significantly, with higher ages at last birth and more children ever 
born. The configuration of social networks, as indicated by marriage witnesses, also 
showed an important association with the adoption of deliberate family limitation. More 
specifically, couples with more age-homogamous and kin-lateral networks were also 
more likely to exhibit modern patterns of birth control, i.e., earlier stopping, more 
spacing,  and smaller families. Similarly, more women among the witnesses were 
connected to modern fertility behavior, which points to the important role played by 
women in the bargaining over reproduction. Bras interprets these findings as indicating 
the important role of declining patriarchy, both in terms of parent-child and husband-
wife relations, for the diffusion of family limitation.  
Thus, Bras’ analysis clearly offers support for blended models, and argues quite 
forcefully that both structural adjustment and innovation diffusion played an important 
role in the adoption of modern fertility behavior in the Netherlands. Although the 
analysis is not able to distinguish causal effects, it seems likely that both sets of factors 
were crucial in explaining the transition, and hence that the effect of social networks on 
fertility was not a simple by-product of social class or urban residence. Instead, both a 
different cost-benefit calculation and shifting patterns of sociability following a decline 
of patriarchy contributed to this process.  
Jan van Bavel  looks at fertility development after the fertility transition in 
conjunction with the so-called baby boom in Belgium. More specifically, Van Bavel 
studies educational differences and relates them to a range of different fertility 
measures. Before the baby boom, i.e., in the period immediately following the fertility 
transition, there were substantial fertility differences by woman’s education. Highly 
educated women (having a  post-secondary educational degree) born at  the very 
beginning of the twentieth century only had about one child on average, while the low 
educated (lower secondary degree or less) had around two children. During the peak of 
the baby boom (cohorts born in the early 1930s) the difference between the two groups 
was less than half a child. While all educational groups showed increasing fertility, the 
highly educated women increased their fertility the most. It is clear that an important 
explanation for this is declining childlessness, especially among educated women. Age 
at first birth and age at first marriage declined in a similar fashion in all educational 
groups, leaving differences across educational levels more or less unchanged. 
These patterns point to a changing educational selectivity in fertility in the period 
of the baby boom. In the early years of the twentieth century, when higher education 
was very uncommon for women, there was a pronounced trade-off between education Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 7 
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and labor force participation on the one hand, and family formation and fertility on the 
other. In other words, when education was highly exclusive, there was a clear over-
representation of women who were less interested in family formation and fertility and 
who gave priority to educational attainment. It could also be that they were constrained 
by social norms of respectability (Oris 2009), but as educational enrollment expanded 
this selection force became weaker and an increasing number of family-prone women 
enrolled in education, which led to declining educational differentials in fertility. 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
It is not by chance that a great deal of research on the fertility decline has been based on 
aggregated data. The problem is finding  good micro-level data covering large 
geographic areas that can provide both a detailed and a general picture of the fertility 
decline and its determinants. The papers included in this special collection, dealing with 
Alghero, Scania, Utah, Quebec, and the Netherlands, are founded on instances of this 
type of long-term collective effort which resulted in population registers. If such data 
sources are well suited to our ambitions, the wealth of census-like data sources have 
been more recently reassessed (Ruggles 2014), and recently anonymized individual and 
household census sheets have been made available at the local or national level. 
The eight contributions brought together  here  enrich previous research by 
systematically questioning the socioeconomic and/or educational differentials in 
fertility before, during, and after the transition. As stated above, the common view is 
that before the transformation of demographic  behavior wealthy people had higher 
fertility and greater reproductive success. Gregory Clark’s book A Farewell to Alms 
(2007) gave new popularity to this idea of “the survival of the richest”. However, the 
empirical evidence is mixed, and does not show a coherent pattern. In several cases, 
pre-transitional socioeconomic differentials in fertility are non-existent or small, and 
statistically insignificant. On the other hand, higher fertility in the upper classes is 
observed in Scania before 1880 and a few other studies have made similar findings 
(e.g.,  Sangoi 1985). In the East Belgian countryside the apparent advantage of the 
wealthy was the result of the lower fertility of day laborers, attributed to bad nutritional 
status affecting women’s fecundity and making them more sensitive to short-term 
economic stresses (Alter, Neven and Oris 2010; Neven 2003). Whatever the causes, the 
available evidence for Asia consistently shows higher fertility of the upper class (Tsuya 
et al. 2010), but in Europe and North America it was definitely not a general pattern. 
A related question is regarding the  knowledge of birth control, or at least the 
importance of human agency, before the transition. Much remains to be performed in 
this area, but recent innovative analyses support this hypothesis (Bengtsson and Dribe Dribe, Oris & Pozzi: Socioeconomic status and fertility before, during and after the demographic transition 
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2006; Tsuya et al. 2010; Van Bavel 2010). It changes slightly the question about 
practices used during the transition. Once again, there is a widely shared view that 
parity-specific stopping was the main driver of the fertility decline. Although this is 
confirmed in Quebec, other contributions regarding this issue show that both stopping 
and spacing acted together. Spacing has often been associated with female agency 
and/or a concern for the mother’s wellbeing both in  historical Western populations 
(Oris 1995) and in the developing south (Van de Walle and Van de Walle 1989). Both 
in the Italian context and in the Netherlands, indications of an impact of female 
bargaining power on reproduction within couples suggest ideational changes arising 
first in the most open groups of the population. 
The interpretation of the transition in terms of cultural diffusion has more often 
been supported (although not proven) by the observation of a gradual diffusion of birth 
control practices across socioeconomic structures from the top to the bottom. The 
empirical results accumulated in this special collection consistently confirm that the 
upper classes were forerunners in the decrease of family size. A top-down chronology 
suggesting a social diffusion is by far the most prevalent pattern. However, all groups 
below the elite in Utah followed simultaneously, while the process in Quebec followed 
the social hierarchy, except for the farmers, who were laggards. Farmers are known to 
be a very heterogeneous group with internal diversity and important contextual effects 
(Van Bavel 2010). Their resistance to change has been observed in other settings, but 
once again we see here that this is not a general pattern. Moreover, some authors have 
claimed that a late transition could reflect not a traditional attitude but rather a 
successful adaptation to economic and demographic changes (Alter, Oris and Neven 
2010). 
Interrelationships with other variables are fascinating complements to this already 
multifaceted and complex picture. In Italy during the first part of the 20
th  century, 
female education was more important than male socioeconomic status. In Belgium, 
highly educated women had much lower fertility before the baby boom of the mid-
century, but during the baby boom the gap decreased as the selection effect weakened 
when education enrolment expanded. In studies of fertility transition, expansion of 
education is often discussed as a provider of resources in terms of knowledge and 
openness, but it could also be an explanation for the formation of a shared culture. 
When school attendance rose, culture was not only formed and transmitted across 
generations within family and community contexts, but also in school classes through 
lessons structured in nation-wide programs that spread the visions and morals of the 
political and  socioeconomic elites across wide territories. This process created 
generations in the sense defined by Mannheim (1928): generations who not only went 
through the course of life together but also shared a common culture. The formation of 
such generational cultures among young, well-educated people could help to explain the Demographic Research: Volume 31, Article 7 
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kin-lateral impact on fertility behavior observed in the Netherlands, and also justify the 
interpretation that it indicates a contestation of patriarchy. 
As always, the set of contributions presented in this special collection provides 
several results and raises some new questions. Because it is obvious that the fertility 
transition happened across Europe and North America during a limited time span, this 
process calls for some general explanation. However, a global explanation must also be 
compatible with the existence of a variety of situations before the transition, and a 
multiplicity of pathways to change during the transition. We stressed here that 
socioeconomic stratification can be used as a filter. Promising paths for future research 
include a deepening of our understanding of interaction effects with education and of 
the constitution of generational cultures. 
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